G:XL Evaluation of its tendering and commissioning processes

The G:XL Project:   

An evaluation of its tendering and commissioning processes

Overview of Evaluation

The G:XL Project commissioned an evaluation of its tendering and commissioning processes, this was done by Alun Severn from Third Sector Services in October 2010.

The evaluation was based on a close analysis of all file documentation relating to the tendering of services and short, extensive discussion with the Project Manager and bayc chief executive, and short, structured telephone interviews with stakeholders involved in the process - whether as bidders, appraisal panel members, G:XL project advisory group members or G:up steering group members.

A total of seven stakeholders kindly consented to provide feedback in telephone interviews. This sample comprised: four representatives from applicant organisations; one G:up Steering Group member; one G:XL Project Advisory Group member; and one Commissioning Panel member.

Questions asked of Stakeholders

The interviews used four simple, open-ended questions as a framework:

1. Did you experience any particular problems or difficulties with the process which should be addressed in any future commissioning/tendering exercises?

2. Do you consider that the tendering process achieved the best outcomes
possible in the circumstances? If not, why?

3. In your view (and from your perspective) do you think anything could have been done to improve the process and/or its outcomes?

4. Did the process reach the best organisations or did restricting tenders only to G:up Infrastructure Support Organisations group members prevent this?

Key Summary Points

  • Virtually all of the salient points raised in the stakeholder feedback reflect the findings from the analysis of file documentation. The key issues raised can be summarised as follows:
  • That clear efforts were made to establish a fair, uniform process for all applicants and that the tendering process was conducted professionally and diligently.
  • Nonetheless, that the potential for conflict of interest existed in bayc's role as accountable body and a member of one of the bidding partnerships and that in the eyes of some this compromised the transparency and integrity of the process.
  • That despite the fact that the tendering process was conducted in adverse circumstances it probably did achieve the best outcomes possible.
  • Some felt that the costs of participation (as a tendering organisation) were disproportionately high or that the process was overly prescriptive and left little room for flexibility or new delivery approaches.
  • Some interviewees do now feel that the process could have been improved by opening up tendering to a wider constituency - i.e. to voluntary organisations beyond G:up's own membership. This is not a universal view, however, and some feel that the low contract values, especially of the Round 1 contracts, played a greater part in restricting the number of tenders received.

Conclusions and Recommendations

1. The project commissioning and tendering processes took place in far from ideal circumstances. Delays in staffing the project, difficulties in translating an overly complex business plan into ‘commissionable' contracts of work, and delays in designing appropriate tendering processes all had an impact on the timing of the tendering process and added to the overall pressure. The organisation of Round 1 of the tendering certainly reflects this and the process was not as methodical as it could have been.

2. These lessons were learnt well, however, and Round 2 was significantly better organised and also benefitted from a longer period for preparation. Not having to work against the clock made a significant difference and the overall process was methodologically better.

3. It has to be acknowledged that the whole tendering exercise netted a total of only ten tenders from five organisations, and that after adjustment to the configuration of contracts, one organisation won all four available contracts. As emphasised elsewhere, however, it must also be recognised that Midland Youth is an alliance of fourteen infrastructure support organisations covering all of the West Midlands local authority areas, and in the case of the Voice & Influence contract won this in partnership with regional play organisation Playtrain. Looked at more positively, then, while strong partnership working within the CYP secto

4. While it may well be that little if anything could have been done which would realistically have changed the outcome above at (3), it is also evident that transparency, objectivity and the potential for conflict of interest were significant concerns for at least a sizeable minority of interviewees. With hindsight, it is evident that the partnership, staffing and line-management arrangements prevailing at the time did put bayc in an invidious position which was almost guaranteed to result in criticism. While acknowledging that the potential for conflict of interest situations has increased generally in the voluntary sector as a result of partnership, networking and joint tendering practices having increased, this only makes it more necessary to avoid such conflicts as far as is possible by scrupulous preparation. With hindsight, it is possible to make the following suggestions:

Transparent written arrangements for avoiding and managing potential conflicts of interest would have helped in the specific circumstances here, with these being formulated and agreed by the project steering group at the very least and perhaps even the wider G:up membership.

At the very least it would have been better for bayc to withdraw from membership of any and all partnerships involved in tendering under the G:XL project for the duration of its accountable body role. This in itself would have gone a long way towards resolving this problem.

If possible, it would probably also have been good practice to establish a clearer division between the project admin., management and support roles of bayc and the Project Manager and the conduct of the tendering process, at least as regards any aspect of decision-making concerning tenders, with tender decision-making resting solely with a Panel chosen for that purpose. It is true that this is what the G:XL project attempted to do, but the concerns expressed by some interviewees demonstrate that at best the arrangements were a source of confusion, and at worst were not considered transparent and were open to negative interpretation.

5. It is possible that a more vigorous approach to promoting G:up membership in the run-up to tendering could have increased the available pool of possible contractors, but again the preceding 18 months or so had not been easy ones for G:up and activity had at best been sporadic. G:up's profile as a consequence was not high and awareness of the network amongst a wider constituency of voluntary sector CYP providers not as good as it might have been.

6. Any interventions that might have had a positive impact on the tendering processes in particular would have had to have been made considerably earlier in the process and ‘further upstream'. There are probably three key points at which different decisions might have produced better outcomes:

  • Earlier activity to increase membership of the G:up ISO members group.
  • Opening up the tendering as widely as possible to include non-member providers.
  • And seeking a reprofiling of the project - rather than reducing the delivery period attached to Phase 1 of the workstreams - so that adequate time could have been spent on getting early preparation right.

7. With hindsight, it is likely that the third measure, reprofiling, would have created some improvement both in terms of the tendering processes running more smoothly and possibly even numbers of tenders. Whether the first two measures would necessarily have produced either a greater number of tenders or a greater diversity of providers to choose from can only really be guessed at.

8. As far as it is possible to tell, the outcomes of the tendering probably represent the best that could have been achieved in adverse circumstances. It is also evident, however, that amongst some stakeholders the process has "left a bad taste", a lingering feeling that it was not sufficiently objective or transparent. This is regrettable. It reflects the complex circumstances in which this project was taken forward but could, at least to some degree, have been avoided. With further partnership projects from within G:up a continuing likelihood, it would be well advised to draft some initial operating guidelines which cover partnership projects, accountable body arrangements and potential conflict of interest situations. These would of course then need reviewing on a case-by-case basis to reflect the precise circumstances of any given project. But even if provisional, such operating guidelines would at least set out the spirit in which G:up members will handle joint projects, and would also indicate to G:up's wider membership that lessons have been learnt from the G:XL project.

If you wish to read the summarised or full evaluation report, please download the attached documents

 

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